I’m interested in ethics and epistemology. Right now I'm writing a book at the intersection of ethics and epistemology defending something pretty unpopular: what it is epistemically correct for you to believe depends, broadly, on what it would be in your interest to believe.

My PhilPapers profile includes abstracts and links to PDFs of my published work. The links below go to the PhilPapers entries for my publications.

In Journals (forthcoming)

  1. Is Deontic Evaluation Capable of Doing What it is For? (with Rob van Someren Greve). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

  2. Ecumenical Epistemic Instrumentalism. Synthese.

In Journals (published)

  1. Should Aggregate Patient Preference Data Be Used to Make Decisions on Behalf of Unrepresented Patients? AMA Journal of Ethics. 21 (7):566-574. 2019.

  2. Promotion as Contrastive Increase in Expected Fit (with Finnur Dellsén). Philosophical Studies. 176 (5):1263-1290. 2019.

  3. Consequentialism & Moral Worth. Utilitas. 31 (2):117-136. 2019.

  4. Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Reason to Believe in Accord with the Evidence. Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809. 2018.

  5. Two Problems for Accepting as Intending. Ethics. 128 (3):626-641. 2018.

  6. Patient Preference Predictors and the Problem of Naked Statistical Evidence. Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (12):857-862. 2018.

  7. Rational Coherence in Environmental Policy: Paris, Montreal, and Kigali. Ethics, Policy and Environment 21 (1):4-8. 2018.

  8. The Beliefs & Intentions of Buridan’s Ass (with Finnur Dellsén). Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 3 (2):209-226. 2017.

  9. In Defense of Comic Pluralism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 20 (2):375-392. 2017.

  10. A Partial Defense of Permissivism. Ratio 30 (1):57-71. 2017.

  11. Checking the Neighborhood: A Reply to DiPaolo & Behrends on Promotion. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 2016.

  12. Fairness and the Strengths of Agents’ Claims. Utilitas 28 (3):347-360. 2016.

  13. How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You’Re Expecting. Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-12. 2015.

  14. On Durant Drake’s ‘May Belief Outstrip Evidence?’. Ethics 125 (2):536-539. 2015.

  15. Problems for Pure Probabilism About Promotion (and a Disjunctive Alternative). Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1371-1386. 2015.

  16. Reasons and Promotion. Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Noûs 25 (1):98-122. 2015.

  17. Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):371-399. 2015.

  18. Nothing but the Evidential Considerations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy94 (2):1-19. 2015.

  19. Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7:1-8. 2013.

In Edited Volumes

  1. Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate. in Metaepistemology – Realism and Anti-Realism, eds. Robin McKenna & Christos Kyriacou, (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming)


  1. Epistemic Consequentialism (Oxford University Press, 2018, 352pp). Utilitas. forthcoming.

  2. Motivational Internalism (Oxford University Press, 2015, 306pp). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2015.